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DUALISM INTACT 
Richard Swinburne 
I have argued in many places that a carefully articulated version of Descartes' 
argument to show that he is essentially an immaterial soul is sound. It is con-
ceivable that I who am currently conscious continue to exist without my 
body, and that can only be if there is currently a non-bodily part of me which 
alone is essential for me. Recent counter-arguments of Alston and Smythe, 
Moser and van der Nat, Zimmerman, and Shoemaker are rejected. 
An argument which I gave in several places1 in the 1980's in favour of 
substance-dualism has generated a number of purported refutations in 
the 1990's. It is time for me to defend myself. 
The argument is a modal argument, similar to that given by 
Descartes2 and intended as an improved version thereof. I call the part 
of the human person composed of ordinary matter their body; and any 
part (if there is one) which is immaterial their soul. The argument 
claims that it is logically possible that my body could suddenly be 
destroyed at an instant and yet (whatever else compatible with this 
might now be the case), I could continue to live a conscious life. (There 
is not supposed to be anything peculiar in this to me-the same applies 
to any other human person now conscious.) Yet if I am to continue to 
exist, some part of me must continue to exist; and so if it is to be possi-
ble for me to continue to exist without my body, I must already have 
another part whose continued existence constitutes my continued exis-
tence-viz. my soul. 
I argued for the claim that if I continue to exist, some part of me must 
continue to exist, from a more general principle which I called the quasi-
Aristotelian assumption. This is that for the continuity of a thing, a sub-
stance, of which properties are predicated, the substance has to continue 
to be made at least in part of some of the same stuff as it was made pre-
viously; and so some part of the original substance made of that stuff 
must continue to form part of it. I call this latter claim the 'quasi-
Aristotelian assumption' because, unlike a strict Aristotelian assumption 
it does not explicitly claim that the stuff of which any substance is made 
and some of which has to be preserved is ordinary matter-it does not 
rule out the possibility of immaterial stuff. We clearly accept this 
assumption for inanimate material objects, where the only stuff conceiv-
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ably involved is ordinary matter. If a desk after 2 p.m. is to be the same 
desk as one up to and at 2 p.m., some part of the subsequent desk must 
be the same. I am happy, for the purposes of the present argument, to 
allow that the identity of a substance can be preserved with gradual 
replacement of parts over time, until there has been a total replacement. 
The full grown oak tree is the same tree as the sapling if the former is 
obtained from the latter by gradual replacement of parts (i.e. atoms), 
even if none of the original parts remain. But since my thought experi-
ment concerns the situation immediately before and immediately after 
an instantaneous destruction of a body, the possibility of identity being 
preserved by a gradual replacement of parts does not arise. The kind of 
'immaterial part' which, given the quasi-Aristotelian assumption, my 
Cartesian argument shows to exist is what we may call a Bonaventurian 
soul, because St. Bonaventure thought that the human soul consisted of 
'spiritual' stuff (materia) informed by a form.3 
To avoid misunderstanding and suspicion that I had committed some 
modal fallacy, I stated my argument in logical symbols, as well as in 
words. The argument was originally designed to prove that I have a 
soul in 1984, and I leave it in that form. Updating is always possible for 
any year in which Premiss 1 is manifestly true. Likewise any name or 
other referring expression can be substituted forT, so long as Premiss 1 
remains manifestly true. I use the usual logical symbols-'&' as 'and', '-' 
as 'not', '0' as 'it is logically possible that'. I define: 
P 'I am a conscious person and I exist in 1984'. 
q 'My body is destroyed in the last instant of 1984'. 
r 'I have a soul in 1984'. 
s 'I exist in 1985' 
x ranges over all consistent propositions compatible with (p 
and q) and describing 1984 states of affairs. 
'(x)' is to be read in the normal way as 'for all propositions x',' 
The argument is then as follows: 
p 
(x) 0 (p & q & x & s) 
- 0 (p & q & -r & s) 
..... Premiss 1 
..... Premiss 2 
..... Premiss 3 
Premiss 2 says that it is possible that I survive into 1985, given that I am 
conscious in 1984, even if my body is totally destroyed and whatever else 
might be the case in 1984, compatible with these last two suppositions. 
Premiss 3 says that it is not possible that I who am conscious in 1984 sur-
vive into 1985 if my body is totally destroyed, unless there is a non-bodily 
part of me in 1984, viz. a soul. It follows from Premiss 2 and Premiss 3 that 
-r is not within the range of x. But since -r describes a 1984 state of affairs, 
it follows that it is not compatible with (p & q). Hence (p & q) entails r. 
But the addition to p of q, which describes what happens to my body at the 
end of 1984 can hardly affect whether or not p entails r. So I conclude that 
p by itself entails r. Hence, from Premiss I, r. 
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All my opponents acknowledge the validity of the argument, but dis-
pute either Premiss 2 or Premiss 3, normally the former. I begin by con-
sidering objections to Premiss 2. Most materialists these days are happy 
to allow that it is logically possible that a person be non-embodied or 
even disembodied. But the most common criticism of Premiss 2 is that I 
have slid carelessly from this de dicta claim to the de re claim that it is log-
ically possible that I become disembodied, and that there is no reason for 
believing the latter. I think that a fair reading of the relevant texts will 
show that I explicitly affirmed the de re claim and that all my arguments 
were designed to substantiate it. However, I acknowledge that there 
were some rather loose initial softening-up sentences which could, out-
side this context, be interpreted differently. 
Among those who accuse me of sliding from the de dicta claim to the 
de re claim are Alston and Smythe." They accuse me of confusing my pre-
miss (2) with their (2A): 
Given p, q, and any consistent proposition about 1984 that is con-
sistent with p and q, it is logically possible that s. 
In my symbols, this reads: 
(x) { (p & q & x) -> 0 s} 
In other words, p & q and any 1984 state of affairs, compatible with p 
and q, entails the logical possibility of s (but not of course the actuality 
of s)-just as my being unmarried at t entails the logical possibility of 
my being married at t, though not of my actually being married at t. 
Their argument now gets muddled because (2A) does not say what 
their verbal exposition of it claims that it does, viz. "that, given p and q, 
no matter what is the case in 1984 (provided it is consistent with p and 
q), it is still logically possible that I continue to exist (in a disembodied 
state, naturally) in 1985." Put symbolically, however, this reads: 
(x) ( p & q & X -> O(p & q & s)} 
Lets call this (2B). (2B) captures the 'continue' to exist, i.e. exist in 
both 1984 and 1985, and the 'disembodied' state of 1985, of their non-
symbolic verbal account which 2A does not capture. They state immedi-
ately after giving what they suppose to be its non-symbolic expression 
that "2A seems to be clearly true". So I take it that they are referring not 
to the obviously trivial 2A, but rather to 2B. However (28) is still not 
enough. I need (2), and I gave arguments for it in The Evolution of the 
Soul (pp.15lf). 
The only arguments which can be given to show some supposition to 
be logically possible are arguments which spell it out, which tell in detail 
a story of what it would be like for it to be true and do not seem to 
involve any contradictions/ i.e. arguments from apparent conceivability. 
Apparent conceivability is evidence (though not of course conclusive 
evidence) of logical possibility. The arguments have the form: take any 
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actual human person, currently conscious in 1984, yet having his body 
destroyed at the end of 1984, conceive of anything you like (compatible 
therewith) being the case with his body during 1984, or happening to the 
bodies of other people, to the proportion of nitrogen in the surface of 
Jupiter or whatever else you choose in 1984; it is still conceivable that he 
goes on existing in 1985. If anyone does not see that at first, a story can 
be told in a lot more detail of what it would be like for it to be true, 
which would help the reader to see it. But of course whatever supposi-
tions x we make about 1984 must be compatible with (p & q). 
Like all worthwhile arguments, mine purported to start from premis-
es which many an opponent might grant-viz. (1), (2), and (3) as they 
stand-to establish a conclusion which he did not previously recognise. 
I suggested that most people not already having a firm philosophical 
position on the mind/body issue will grant my premises. But someone 
already having a firm philosophical position contrary to mine can chal-
lenge my premiss (2) by inserting an x which he claims to be compatible 
with p and q and which he claims will show the premiss to be false, 
where x states a philosophical thesis about the very issue in dispute, 
contrary to the one which I am seeking to prove. Examples include "I 
am purely material in 1984" of Alston and Smythe, or "I am identical 
with my body or some part of it" of Zimmerman? Now of course I claim 
that no such x is compatible with (p & q). Since I put forward premisses 
(2) and (3) as purported necessary truths, my argument was designed to 
show that (given p) r is a necessary truth. The claim therefore that any x 
of the above type is compatible with (p & q) amounts to the denial of my 
conclusion. Now it is true that my argument will not convince anyone 
who claims to be more certain that the conclusion is false than that the 
premises are true. But then that does not discredit my argument-for no 
argument about anything will convince someone in that position. My 
argument was designed for those prepared to set aside philosophical 
dogma concerned explicitly with the mind/body issue, and rely only on 
philosophical theses and intuitions about logical possibility relating to 
other or wider issues. 
In the earlier part of their paper Alston and Smythe make what is in 
effect a claim that no mere assertions about logical possibility could have 
any tendency to show what I in fact am (e.g. that I am not only a body). 
But given the quasi-Aristotelian assumption (which they only factor into 
this part of their discussion briefly at the end), their claim must be false. 
For any substance, there must be something which makes it that sub-
stance rather than any other one. A substance has an essence. The quasi-
Aristotelian assumption says that the stuff of which a substance is made 
belongs to the essence of the substance; it is involved in what makes the 
substance that substance. So if I am only a body, the stuff that makes me 
me must be ordinary matter. That the stuff which made me me is ordi-
nary matter would then be no mere contingent truth about me; it would 
be necessarily true. Hence a crucial necessary truth would follow from "I 
am only a body" that I could not exist without my body (whereas no sim-
ilar crucial necessary truth follows is the analogy on p.129 of Alston and 
Smythe from "I am a bachelor".) Since (given my Premiss 2) the purport-
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ed necessary truth is false, so too must be the claim that I am only a body. 
My argument thus has the same pattern as a well-known argument of 
Kripke where he argues that the actual constitution of a substance deter-
mines the logical possibilities for its constitution: 
Supposing this lectern is in fact made of wood, could this very 
lectern have been made from the very beginning of its existence 
from ice, say frozen from water in the Thames? One has a consid-
erable feeling that it could 1l0U 
A bolder and more general principle was invoked by Shoemaker, to 
show that no thought experiments could establish Premiss 2: 
In general, it is quite hopeless to suppose that a claim of de re possi-
bility, a claim to the effect that some actually existing thing could 
undergo such-and-such changes, can be grounded on mere 
thought-experiments, or on considerations of what can be sup-
posed or imagined without logical or conceptual incoherence." 
Shoemaker is correct in supposing that no claim of de re possibility 
can be grounded merely on thought-experiments. But in supposing that 
this point counts against my argument, he is quite mistaken. For my 
claim is not so grounded-it has a crucial contingent first premiss. And 
if Shoemaker is claiming that thought-experiments cannot playa crucial 
role in determining de re possibility, he is also mistaken-as the Kripke 
example illustrates. What happens is that the thought-experiment 
shows that a certain kind of thing can or cannot undergo certain 
changes. Then some contingent premiss states or entails that a particu-
lar object a is (either necessarily or contingently) a certain sort of thing. 
And then it follows that this or that can or cannot happen to a. A contin-
gent premiss tells us that Hesperus is a planet. Thought-experiments 
show that for any planet to continue to exist it must retain (much of) the 
same matter. We then conclude that Hesperus cannot lose all its matter. 
But if the contingent premiss told us that Hesperus is a ghost, that con-
clusion would not follow. 
What is, however, more dubious is my Premiss 3, or rather-as I 
acknowledge in The Evolution of the Soul-the quasi-Aristotelian assump-
tion which I use to argue in support of it. This assumption, as I claimed 
earlier, clearly states a necessary condition for the identity over time of 
inanimate material objects-where the only kind of stuff at stake is ordi-
nary matter. But given my premiss (2), I wrote in The Evolution of the 
Soul (p.153) we have a choice: "Either we can say simply that persons 
are different-in their case continuing matter is not necessary for the 
continued existence of the substance, or we can try to make sense of this 
fact by liberalising Aristotle's account" - (that continuing ordinary matter 
is necessary for the identity of substances) and allow a non-material 
stuff. My adoption of the latter alternative was in a way a concession to 
the materialist: it was trying to preserve as much as possible of his 
"integrated system of thought" (my p. 153), i.e. a hylemorphic theory, 
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which says that the identity of all substances depends on the stuff of 
which they are made, and the form imposed upon it-that is, the prop-
erties essential to a substance of that kind. A substance is the same sub-
stance as an earlier one if it is made of the same stuff (approximately, or 
stuff obtained by gradual replacement thereof) and if it retains the essen-
tial properties of a substance of the kind in question. (If the original sub-
stance is a tree, the later substance can only be the same substance if it is 
also a tree.)'O My quasi-Aristotelian assumption kept this basic idea but 
allowed the possibilities of non-material stuff (and so non-material sub-
stances made solely thereof). It thus allowed a relatively unified account 
of the identity of substances, inanimate and animate. 
Now it is indeed true that there are many philosophers who wish to 
give a very different account of the identity over time of persons (and 
we may suppose, more generally-of animate beings) from the account 
they give of inanimate substances. They maintain that whether a later 
person is the same as some earlier person depends solely on whether the 
later person has the right relational properties, i.e. exhibits the right 
relations to the earlier person (when being composed of such and such 
stuff or parts is not a property). A Humean Theory of personal identity 
for example makes the identity of a later person with an earlier person 
depend on such features as the later person having the same apparent 
memories as, and apparent memories caused by, those of the earlier per-
son. Apparent memories are properties possessed by a substance; they 
are abilities apparently to recall. The main burden of the criticism of me 
by Moser and Van der Nat" seems to be that in putting forward my 
quasi-Aristotelian assumption, I have not taken seriously the possibility 
of a relational theory of personal identity. 
The reason which I gave implicitly in The Evolution of the Soul for not 
exploring such possibilities is that we need an integrated theory of what 
makes for the identity of substances over time, and that a relational the-
ory of personal identity made the identity of persons depend on very 
different factors from the identity of inanimate substances. However, I 
should perhaps have spelled out there the well-known objections to any 
relational theory of personal identity, which I did spell out in Personal 
Identity with respect to the best known kind of relational theory-a 
memory and character theory. 
These objections boil down to the following. Any relational theory of 
personal identity ever proposed either has the consequence that indefi-
nitely many later persons can satisfy the criteria for being the same per-
son as a certain earlier person (the duplication objection), or has the con-
sequence that which later person is the same person as the earlier person 
depends on what happens to a third person (the arbitrariness objection). 
The duplication objection will apply if more than one later person can 
have the relevant relational properties (e.g. 'psychological continuity' 
with the earlier person). And of course any such account must be 
false-for the well known reason, that if two later persons are the same 
as the earlier person they would be the same as each other-and, by 
hypothesis, they are not. The duplication objection is normally met by 
insisting that the relational properties include one which can only be sat-
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isfied (in each possible world) by at most one person. The trouble is that 
the crucial property offered is always one which involves the later per-
son exemplifying some relation to the earlier person in some way better 
than other later persons-e.g. by exemplifying a relation to a greater 
degree or earlier in time than others. Thus a writer may claim that a 
later P2 is the same as an earlier PI only if P2 has the property of being 
the first person causally connected with PI to have similar apparent 
memories; or is in other ways the "closest continuer"12 of PI. But then 
whether P2 is the same person as PI will depend on what happens or 
does not happen to persons other than P2 e.g. whether PI causally gen-
erated some other similar person before generating P2, or whether some 
person who would otherwise have been the "closest continuer" dies pre-
maturely. And is it not absurd to suppose that who I (P2) am depends 
on what happens to someone else? Whether I am elected to some office 
may depend on how many votes are given to someone else, but that 
who I am can depend on such extrinsic factors seems absurd. This is the 
arbitrariness objection-my identity becomes an arbitrary matter. 
There are philosophers who are prepared to accept that (in the stated 
sense) personal identity is an arbitrary matter. Parfit would claim that it 
is an arbitrary matter but that does not matter, because identity does not 
matter. What matters is survival. Survival, unlike identity, can be 
duplicated. A person can have many surviving selves, in which he sur-
vives to different degreesY But the issue is-can any intelligible account 
be given of what it is for me to "survive" except in terms of a later per-
son being the same person as the earlier one? Many writers have point-
ed out that for inanimate things, clouds and countries and armies, iden-
tity clearly is an arbitrary matter. Whether a later country is the same as 
an earlier country will often depend on what happens to bits of territory 
not included in the later country, etc. But the point is just that these are 
inanimate things. If I undergo some operation, or my brain state is 
copied in some way before my body is destroyed, there is clearly a truth 
here about whether or not I have survived this process. Before the 
process I seek my continued existence. Afterward we may not know 
whether my endeavours have been fulfilled. But only someone already 
in the grip of a strong philosophical dogma, could deny that there is a 
truth about whether or not I have survived an operation or brain-copy-
ing process; which does not depend on what happens to someone else. 
He who hopes to survive his death will not be satisfied by the knowl-
edge that someone very like him will live again. 
It was these implausible consequences of every proposed relational 
property theory of personal identity, which-among other reasons-led 
philosophers to seek a criterion of identity which did not permit dupli-
cation and was not open to the arbitrariness objection. Such a criterion 
will make who someone is depend solely on non-duplicable factors 
intrinsic to him. Some sort of Aristotelian or quasi-Aristotelian princi-
ple will have the desired result. If you insist that the later person has to 
have (most of) the matter, or (most of) the brain matter of the earlier per-
son, there will be no duplicates; and who is who is not (in the above 
sense) arbitrary, for the criterion of having (most of) the (brain) matter of 
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PI is a criterion whose satisfaction depends on what is the case with P2, 
quite independently of what has happened to any other person. And if 
ordinary matter will not-given my Cartesian argument-provide the 
requisite satisfactory criterion then immaterial stuff (which, because it is 
not space-occupying and so not necessarily extended, we may suppose 
to come in indivisible units, souls) will provide the requisite criterion. 
All of this provides the reason for holding the quasi-Aristotelian 
assumption, as well as the fact that it provides criteria of identity for ani-
mate beings as similar as can be to those for inanimate beings. 
There is, however, one kind of relational theory of personal identity 
which is immune to the duplication and arbitrariness objections. But it 
is one which I suspect the average modern analytic philosopher would 
be even less happy to adopt than he would be to adopt the 
Bonaventurian theory given above. Any relational theory of personal 
identity is bound to fail if the only properties considered are universals, 
i.e. properties which could (maybe only in a different possible world) be 
instantiated in different individuals. For just because it is contingent in 
which person the property is instantiated, the property cannot suffice to 
make the person who he is. We normally think of properties as univer-
sals, and may indeed make it a matter of definition that to be a property 
something has to be a universaP\ but if we do thus make it a matter of 
definition, there can be no viable relational theory of personal identity. 
Clearly any relational theory open to the duplication objection has made 
personal identity depend on universals. And if a theory is open to the 
arbitrariness objection, this will be because a different person could have 
had the suggested identifying property. If relational properties are to 
provide the criterion of identity over time, they must be non-univer-
sals. IS The theory, that is, must state that to be PI a later individual must 
have a certain relation (R) to PI which can be possessed by no other 
individual than PI in any other possible world. The relation must hold 
solely in virtue of factors intrinsic to PI, if the criterion is to avoid the 
arbitrariness objection. Once we allow non-universal properties, one 
such could be the property of being identical with PI, for in no possible 
world could any individual other than a certain individual (viz. PI) have 
that property. Such a property we may call an individual essence. All 
other non-universal properties are properties whose possession entails 
the possession of a certain individual essence-for example the property 
of remembering doing what PI did in 1984 (to be distinguished from the 
property of apparently remembering what PI did in 1984). Anyone 
who has the former property will have PI's individual essence, but not 
conversely-PI may now suffer from amnesia. So the crucial relational 
"property" is PI's individual essence. P2's having that "property" is 
both necessary and sufficient for his being Pl. If we are prepared to 
allow individual essences, personal identity can certainly be analysed in 
terms of possession of relational properties. A later person is the same 
person as an earlier person if and only if he has the same individual 
essence. Who an embodied person is depends on which individual 
essence is coinstantiated with his other properties. 
Given the logical possibility for which I agreed earlier in the paper, 
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that any embodied person can become disembodied, there are two pos-
sible theories of how this could come about. One is that there is again 
immaterial stuff, instantiation of his individual essence in which consti-
tutes the continuing existence of a disembodied person. But on that the-
ory we would have two kinds of new thing-immaterial stuff and indi-
vidual essences. It is simpler to suppose that the individual essence can 
exist on its own without being instantiated in any stuff (exist that is in 
the full-blooded way in which substances exist, not in the pale way in 
which properties such as squareness "exist" when there are no square 
objects). It would be a substance on its own, whether or not instantiated 
in ordinary matter. Individual essences are very strange properties 
indeed. 
Duns Scotus seems explicitly committed to individual essences; 
and-though he had not thought through his views consistently-
Aquinas was also, I believe, implicitly committed to them. Aquinas 
affirms that the human soul (which is a form, and so a property) is what 
makes an individual human person the person he is. When the soul of 
Socrates is instantiated in a body, we have Socrates. But Aquinas also 
held that the soul of Socrates could exist without the body and live some 
sort of a mental life, though it would not on its own be a human person. 
The soul of a human was thus a "subsistent form" and in Summa Contra 
Gentiles though not in Summa Theologiae he calls it a substance.16 (If we 
understand by a substance something which can exist on its own, that is 
what he must say that the soul is. But he does not always thus under-
stand it.) So we can do without Bonaventurian souls (parts of persons 
made of immaterial stuff), if we allow Thomist souls-non-universal 
properties which are also substances. I think that there is a lot to be said 
for Thomist souls/7 but-suspecting that a modern philosopher would 
be marginally more tolerant of Bonaventurian souls-I commended the 
quasi-Aristotelian principle. But if you drop it and allow individual 
essences which can exist by themselves, then, when they are joined to 
matter to form embodied humans, they are substantial enough (not 
merely universals which cannot exist un-instantiated) to be parts of 
those humans (though not parts made of stuff), and so Premiss (3) is 
true for different reasons. So again, the argument goes through. It 
remains quite undefeated by any of the counter-arguments which any 
objector has raised. 
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Why that should be is however quite mysterious, if a soul is capable of exist-
ing without a body. Why should it not be joined again to a new but perhaps 
qualitatively similar body? And it is difficult to see how a soul could be fit-
ted to occupy a certain body unless there was something intrinsic to it which 
made it different from other souls, and which would therefore be sufficient 
to individuate it. Scotus made this latter criticism in Ordillatio II d 3 P 1 q7 
nn 230-1. For full analysis of the views of this issue of Duns Scotus, and of 
the internal tensions within Aquinas's account of the soul, see my The 
Christian God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) pp. 47-50. (In line 2 and line 4 
of Additional Note 3, read 'subsistent forms' instead of 'substantial forms'.) 
17. And indeed have defended it and put my account of personal identi-
ty in terms of it in The Christian God. 
